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Abstract
The paper begins with a reexamination of claims regarding the welfare-theoretical
efficiency of various modes of non-hierarchical policy coordination which Charles
Lindblom (1965) had subsumed under the label of "Partisan Mutual Adjustment". It
is argued that these claims are implausible if Lindblom’s mechanisms of horizontal
self-coordination are examined one at a time. They either will not assure significant
welfare gains in the general case, or the attempt to raise the level of general welfare
through self-coordination will encounter rapidly escalating transaction costs. As Lind-
blom had pointed out, however, several coordination methods will often be combined
in real-world policy processes. The intuition that this might significantly increase the
welfare efficiency of self-coordination is explored in a computer simulation study based
on the game-theoretical reformulation of five simple coordination mechanisms. We
can show that, in a given population of interdependent actors, "Positive Coordination"
within relatively small coalitions who are required to obtain the agreement of outside
actors through "Negative Coordination" and "Bargaining", are able to achieve relatively
high welfare gains while economizing on transaction costs. This pattern is by no means
unusual in real-world policy processes.
* * * * *
Der Aufsatz untersucht die Plausibilität von Behauptungen über die wohlfahrtstheoreti-
sche Effizienz von Methoden der nicht-hierarchischen Koordination politisch-admini-
strativer Akteure, die Charles Lindblom (1965) unter dem Sammelbegriff des "Partisan
Mutual Adjustment" zusammengefaßt hatte. Für jede einzelne dieser Methoden, so
kann gezeigt werden, ist dieser Anspruch nicht generell zu begründen. Entweder
können unter allgemeinen Bedingungen nur geringe Wohlfahrtsgewinne erzielt werden,
oder die Koordination scheitert an eskalierenden Transaktionskosten. Allerdings hatte
schon Lindblom darauf hingewiesen, daß in realen Politikprozessen typischerweise
mehrere Koordinationsmethoden zugleich zum Zuge kommen. Die Vermutung, daß
gerade dadurch die Wohlfahrts-Effizienz der horizontalen Selbstkoordination gesteigert
werden könnte, wird hier in einer Computer-Simulationsstudie überprüft. Ausgehend
von einer spieltheoretischen Rekonstruktion von fünf einfachen Koordinationsmechanis-
men kann gezeigt werden, daß insbesondere die Kombination von "Positiver Koordina-
tion" mit "Negativer Koordination" und mit "Bargaining" eine hohe Wohlfahrtseffizienz
erreicht. Wenn die Mitglieder relativ kleiner Koalitionen sich intern positiv koordinie-
ren, aber die Zustimmung der übrigen Mitglieder einer Population von interdependen-
ten Akteuren durch Negativkoordination und Bargaining gewinnen müssen, dann
können relativ hohe Wohlfahrtsgewinne bei moderaten Transaktionskosten erwartet
werden. Eben dieses Muster läßt sich auch in realen Prozessen der Politikformulierung
und Implementation wiederfinden.
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1 The Promise of Self-Coordination
Normative theories of representative democracy generally presuppose hierarchi-
cal governance. Democratic accountability seems to require that policy choices
should originate from a unitary government (or a presidency) that is legitimated
through competitive general elections, that they should be ratified by majority
decisions in parliament, and that they should then be implemented by a disci-
plined bureaucracy relying on the superior force of the state and using resourc-
es collected through general taxation. By holding the governing hierarchy ac-
countable to the general electorate, and by minimizing the direct influence of
special interests on any phase of the policy process, the democratic process is
supposed to produce policy outcomes that will maximize the general welfare
of the polity.
In the real world of Western democracies, of course, actual policy choices are
often worked out through negotiations among the representatives of partial
interests in a great variety of arenas - among ministerial departments, among
coalition parties, among specialized legislative committees, between the federal
government and the states, in transnational agreements, in neocorporatist con-
certation between the government and peak associations of capital and labor,
or other representatives of sectoral self-organization, and in issue-specific policy
networks involving interest organizations together with specialized subunits
within the executive and legislative branches of government. Typically, parties
to these negotiations not only represent particular interests, but they also are
likely to control specific action resources - jurisdictional competencies, or the
loyalty of certain segments of the population - whose use may be essential for
the achievement of policy goals.
All of these forms of negotiated policy making present challenges to conven-
tional democratic theory that are not yet well understood. During the 1970s
and 1980s, the attention of political scientists was mainly focused on the impli-
cations of neo-corporatist concertation (Schmitter/ Lehmbruch 1979; Lehm-
bruch/ Schmitter 1982; Goldthorpe 1984). After the apparent decline of this
mode of governance, there now seems to be a renewed interest in pluralist
policy networks involving a larger number of governmental and nongovern-
mental corporate actors in more loosely-coupled interactions (Laumann/ Knoke
1987; Schneider 1988; Marin 1990; Marin/ Mayntz 1991).
Much of this recent work is empirical and explanatory, drawing on the power-
ful tools of social network analysis (cluster analysis, block models, graph theory,
etc.) for more accurate descriptions of highly complex structures of interaction.
In general (but see Mayntz 1992; 1993b), less systematic attention is now paid
to the normative, or evaluative, questions that were a central concern of the
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theorists of pluralist democracy in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., Truman 1951; Dahl
1967), as well as of their critics (McConnell 1966; Lowi 1969). In the present
paper, we will address these concerns in an analytical effort that takes as its
point of departure the intellectually most ambitious attempt to justify pluralist
policy making in welfare-theoretical terms.
Charles Lindblom (1959) described governance in pluralist democracies as a
"Science of Muddling Through" that relies on Disjointed Incrementalism as its
"Strategy of Decision" (Braybrooke/ Lindblom 1963) and whose "Intelligence"
is produced through Partisan Mutual Adjustment (Lindblom 1965). Both of these
practices are primarily justified ex negativo - by comparison, that is, to the
counterfactual ideal of hierarchical governance based on "synoptic" analyses
of all pertinent issues and affected interests. While the synoptic ideal is said
to overtax the bounded rationality of real-world decision makers, the incremen-
talist strategy will disaggregate large and complex issues into series of small
steps that reduce the risks of misinformation and miscalculation, and that can
use rapid feedback to correct any errors. Similarly, instead of relying on the
benevolence and omniscience of central decision makers, Partisan Mutual Ad-
justment will directly involve representatives of affected groups and specialized
office holders that are able to utilize local information, and to fend for their
own interests in pluralist bargaining processes. In short, compared to an impos-
sible ideal, muddling through is not only feasible but likely to increase overall
welfare by producing policy choices that are, at the same time, better informed
and more sensitive to the affected interests.
It is fair to say that Lindblom’s critique of the synoptic and centralized ideal
found a much more sympathetic audience than his welfare-theoretic defense
of incrementalism and pluralist bargaining. Incrementalism was equated with
the "tyranny of small decisions" (Kahn 1966) that must systematically preclude
large-scale policy changes. Its conservative implications were thus in conflict
with the planning optimism and the reformist spirit of the period (Dror 1964;
Etzioni 1968). On the pluralist front, the egalitarian assumption that all societal
interest were in fact effectively organized, had been attacked on empirical
grounds by "elite theorists" in American sociology and political science (Hunter
1953; Mills 1956; Schattschneider 1960). An even more fundamental challenge
was raised by Mancur Olson’s analytical demonstration that, under rational-
actor assumptions, the most widely shared interests would be least capable of
organization, or at least systematically disadvantaged in collective action (Olson
1965). Finally, the rise of public choice theory with its emphasis on rent-seeking
in the public sector has dampened any remaining enthusiasm for the welfare
potential of pluralist bargaining - in fact, Mancur Olson has since placed the
blame for the economic "decline of nations" precisely on the effectiveness of
"distributive coalitions" in pluralist democracies (Olson 1982).
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In his later work, Lindblom himself has conceded some of these points. That
is particularly true of the egalitarian issue - where he now describes the "market
as prison" (Lindblom 1982) to characterize the superior influence of capitalist
interests in market economies. Since policy makers depend on profit-oriented
private investment for economic growth and employment, capital interests must
be respected through "deferential adaptation" and need not even be actively
pursued through pluralist lobbying (Lindblom 1977). At the same time, Lind-
blom also had second thoughts on the virtues of incrementalism and mutual
adjustment, suggesting that these practices might be most useful for a subclass
of "secondary issues" while "grand issues" would benefit from "broad-ranging,
often highly speculative, and sometimes utopian thinking about directions and
possible futures, near and far in time" (Lindblom 1979: 522). In that regard,
however, he may well have gone too far in his self-criticism. Some recent work
suggests that the incrementalist strategy of decision may have greater reformist
potential than it was given credit for by Lindblom’s critics (Gregory 1989;
Weiss/ Woodhouse 1992). In our opinion, the same can also be demonstrated
for "Partisan Mutual Adjustment". In order to do so, we will first reconstruct
and systematize the variety of coordinating mechanisms that can be subsumed
under the common label of PMA, and we will then present the results of com-
puter simulation experiments that were designed to explore the welfare effects,
as well as the transaction costs, of these coordination mechanisms used sepa-
rately and in combination.
2 Varieties of Partisan Mutual Adjustment
When the decisions of one actor have an impact on matters that are also the
object of the decisions of another actor, welfare gains may be obtained through
the coordination of these decisions. While coordination is generally considered
desirable, it is also a poorly understood concept. Lindblom (1965: 154) provides
at least a rudimentary definition:
A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in it such that
the adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions in the set are
to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or out-
weighed.
Thus, negative externalities should be avoided or compensated and, of course,
positive externalities should be identified and exploited. Optimal coordination,
in other words, is defined not merely by the Pareto criterion but by the utilitari-
an Kaldor criterion according to which public policy measures should be under-
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taken whenever their negative consequences are outweighed by their expected
aggregate benefits (Kaldor 1939). But Lindblom is less concerned with defini-
tions of welfare-theoretic optimality than with the demonstration that the wel-
fare gains of coordination can be realized in the absence of a central, hierarchi-
cal coordinator and even in the absence of common goals and world views
among the actors involved. In everyday life, "people can coordinate with each
other without anyone’s coordinating them, without a dominant common pur-
pose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other"
(1965: 3) - and the same is supposedly true of the multiple participants in plu-
ralist policy processes. They should be able to achieve coordination through
one of several methods of "Partisan Mutual Adjustment".
Lindblom provides an "exhaustive list" of altogether twelve such methods,
subdivided into two classes of "Adaptive Adjustment" and "Manipulated Ad-
justment" (1965: 33-4). While the latter class describes variants of negotiations
whose definitions are neither particularly original nor very systematic (and
which we will try to redefine in the later part of this section), the former in-
cludes two forms of non-negotiated coordination, "Parametric Adjustment" and
"Deferential Adjustment", whose existence is not generally recognized in the
literature. They are important enough to merit a more thorough explication and
discussion of their welfare-theoretic characteristics.
2.1 Parametric Adjustment
We begin our examination with "Parametric Adjustment" which Lindblom
defined as follows (1965: 37):
In a decision situation, a decision maker X adjusts his decision to Y’s decisions
already made and to Y’s expected decisions; but he does not seek, as a recog-
nized condition of making his own decision effective, to induce a response from
Y; nor does he allow the choice of his decision to be influenced by any consider-
ation of the consequences of his decision for Y.
It is clear from this definition and the accompanying descriptive examples that
Lindblom has in mind a form of interaction which, in game-theoretic terminolo-
gy (which he never uses, however), could be described as a peculiar type of
noncooperative sequential game. What makes it peculiar - in contrast to the
superhuman assumptions of classical game theory - are the much more modest
demands on the information available to, and the computational capacities
possessed by, the players. In Parametric Adjustment, players depend on only
two sets of information: the first describing the status quo, as it was brought
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about by the past moves of players, and the second describing their own poten-
tial moves and the outcomes these will, ceteris paribus, be able to produce. In
addition, players must, of course, be able to compare these outcomes to the
status quo in the light of their own self-interest. But they are explicitly not
required to have ex-ante information on the payoffs and potential moves of
other players, and they are not expected to be able to anticipate the future
responses of other players to the moves which they, themselves, are consider-
ing. It is only when another player makes a move, or proposes a certain move,
that they must be able to identify its impact on their own interest position. In
other words, the need for omniscience and the infinite regress of conditional
expectations, which are likely to overtax the capacities of real actors in the
simultaneous, or fully anticipated sequential, games of noncooperative game
theory (Scharpf 1990), are cut short by these assumptions of bounded ration-
ality.
By itself, that is not remarkable. Bounded rationality is a flexible concept that
can be defined to mean various things. The point which Lindblom needs to
make is that the assumed constraints on rationality will not necessarily have
negative effects, in welfare-theoretic terms, on the outcomes obtained. He
achieves this purpose through a peculiar interpretation of the sequential nature
of moves in Parametric Adjustment. In effect, the functions which classical game
theory ascribes to mutual anticipation, based on the common knowledge of
strategies and payoffs, are here supposed to be performed by hindsight in
ongoing processes of interaction. In these processes, ex-ante information and
forward-planning are replaced by sequences of responses, "creating in the
‘present’ a rapid succession of ‘pasts’ to which each rapidly succeeding decision
can be adapted" (Lindblom 1965: 39).
But while it is surely true that, in ongoing processes of interdependent choices,
each move of a self-interested and myopic player may impose externalities on
others, or create new opportunities for others, to which these will again re-
spond, and so on - that does not assure the equivalence of outcomes to those
that would be achieved under conditions of complete information and perfect
foresight. If there is an equivalence, it must be owed to the concept of a nonco-
operative "Nash" equilibrium which - regardless of how it was reached - cannot
be unilaterally left again by perfectly or boundedly rational players. It is this
possibility of a Nash equilibrium which justifies Lindblom’s optimism that,
in Parametric Adjustment, "chaos is not the only possible consequence. What
may ensue is a kind of process of successive approximation" (1965: 40).
So far, so good. We know from historical case studies that myopic actors, in
noncooperative games played sequentially, may "lock in" on a path-dependent
equilibrium where none of the players is left with an option that could still
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improve her own situation (David 1985; Arthur 1990); and we have it from the
best game-theoretic authority that a game of incomplete information, in which
players are ignorant of each others’ preferences, may be the equivalent of a
(much more complicated) game of complete information (Brams/ Doherty
1993).
But as Lindblom recognizes, equilibrium is not the most likely outcome. While
mathematical game theory assures us that every noncooperative simultaneous
game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, players in Lind-
blom’s version of a sequential game are constrained to use only pure strategies,
and the path dependent nature of the process may also place some existing
pure-strategy equilibria beyond the reach of players who must start from a
particular status-quo position. As a consequence, the probability of reaching
any equilibrium outcome at all diminishes rapidly as the number of players
and the number of their available options increases. Interaction may then deteri-
orate into an unending sequence of meandering moves - with presumably
negative welfare consequences.
But even when an equilibrium can be reached, there is no reason to think - as
Lindblom seems to do - that it must be a good solution. In fact, any speculation
about the welfare-theoretical qualities of non-cooperative equilibria is meaning-
less unless the original game constellation is well defined. When that constella-
tion resembles an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, the outcome of a sequential
non-cooperative game - even when players are non-myopic and fully rational -
will be the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1967) in which all parties end
up worse-off than in the status quo from which they started. That this is by
no means an unlikely outcome is demonstrated by the inflationary spirals pro-
duced by partisan mutual adjustment among fragmented and competing labor
unions (Scharpf 1992a). And even when constellations are more benign, mutual
adjustment may well "lock in" on a local optimum that is inferior to better
solutions which, however, cannot be reached through path-dependent sequen-
tial moves. A pertinent example is provided by Paul David’s famous study of
the evolution of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David 1985).
However, while there surely is no general reason to consider Parametric Adjust-
ment or sequential noncooperative games as a promising method for achieving
welfare-increasing coordination, there are certain specific types of game constel-
lations where precisely this method is superior to all others in achieving coordi-
nation at the lowest transaction costs. One obvious example are games of pure
coordination where interests coincide, and where even the problem of converg-
ing upon one among several, and equally acceptable, coordination points (Schel-
ling 1960) is eliminated by the sequential character of Lindblom’s game. Once
one party has moved, the other one has no problem in making an optimal
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choice. Of course, under such benign circumstances, all other methods of coor-
dination would also work equally well.
But Parametric Adjustment also turns out to be the optimal approach to certain
types of mixed-motive game constellations in which other coordination mecha-
nisms would run into difficulties. The prime example are constellations resem-
bling the Battle of the Sexes game, in which all parties prefer a coordinated
outcome over the consequences of non-coordination, but where there is conflict
over the choice among several coordinated solutions which differ in their dis-
tributive consequences. Under such conditions, coordination may not be
achieved at all in noncooperative games with simultaneous moves, and even
when binding agreements are possible, they may fail to be reached because of
high transaction costs. By contrast, coordination is quite easily achieved in a
noncooperative game that is being played sequentially. Here, whichever player
moves first is able to select her most preferred solution, while later players
(assuming perfect information on others’ past moves) will find it in their inter-
est to converge on the coordinated solution so defined, even though it is by
no means their most preferred outcome.1 Given the fact that they still prefer
coordination to non-coordination, they have no rational alternative. Similar
conditions are likely to prevail in constellations resembling the Chicken game.
2.2 Deferential Adjustment
Nevertheless, these are narrowly circumscribed constellations which will not
justify a positive evaluation of the welfare consequences of "Parametric Adjust-
ment" in the general case. To a somewhat lesser degree, that verdict also applies
to "Deferential Adjustment", Lindblom’s second type of non-cooperative coordi-
nation mechanism which he defined as follows:
1 This form of coordination was identified by Philipp Genschel (1993) in an empiri-
cal study of coordination within and among specialized standard-setting commit-
tees in international telecommunications. Even though there is a high degree of
overlap between the jurisdictional domains of these committees, and even though
their membership is also overlapping (so that all actors are fully aware of the
interdependence among separate standardization processes), there is no attempt
to achieve overall coordination either through merging adjacent committees or
through establishing liaison committees that would work out common solutions.
Instead, whichever committee is further advanced in its own work will define
its own standard, while the other committees will take that standard into account
in their own subsequent work. As a result, the overall patchwork of standards
tends to be highly coordinated and, in that sense, efficient.
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In a decision situation, a decision maker X does not seek, as a condition of mak-
ing his own decision, to induce a response from another decision maker Y. He
either deliberately avoids impinging adversely on Y’s values or he takes care
not knowingly to impinge adversely, except trivially, on Y’s values as Y perceives
them at the time of X’s decision; nor does he tailor his decision to create a gain
for Y (1965: 45).
In other words, Deferential Adjustment requires that decision-makers unilateral-
ly avoid negative externalities for other actors or their jurisdictional domains.
This resembles the "Negative Coordination" which Mayntz and Scharpf had
found to prevail in the German federal bureaucracy, where departmental policy
initiatives must, as a rule, be designed so as to avoid potential objections from
other departments since the Cabinet is generally unwilling to act in the face
of unresolved interdepartmental conflict (Mayntz/ Scharpf 1975: 145-150). More
generally, the pattern is likely to arise in all constellations where jurisdictional
domains, property rights or vested interests are protected by substantive law,
by procedural veto positions, by the anticipation of retaliation, or by mutual
sympathy (Scharpf 1993). While the existence of these conditions surely cannot
be universally assumed, Deferential Adjustment or Negative Coordination still
occurs frequently enough to merit systematic attention.
In their study of interdepartmental policy making, Mayntz and Scharpf empha-
sized the dangers of political immobilism when innovative options were
blocked by interdepartmental vetoes. Lindblom, on the other hand, had focused
on the welfare-theoretic advantages of "Deferential" over "Parametric Adjust-
ment": By excluding moves that would violate another party’s interests, it
would prevent players from locking into Nash equilibria that are inferior to
the status quo. Moreover, since the status quo cannot be left at all2 if anybody
has reason to object, the danger of endlessly meandering moves and counter
moves in situations without a Nash equilibrium is also eliminated. Unlike Para-
metric Adjustment in non-cooperative games, therefore, Negative Coordination
will only permit policy changes that are pareto-superior to the status quo.
At the same time, however, this form of coordination can hardly exploit the
potential welfare gains inherent in a particular constellation of interests. Lind-
blom, it is true, hopes that the self-blocking tendencies of veto systems will also
stimulate the search for innovative solutions that are acceptable all around
(1965: 47-51). But when all is considered, it still is analytically true that the
2 That is only true if changes must be brought about by new decision initiatives.
If the status quo should deteriorate as a consequence of external changes, a pure
system of negative coordination would prevent the adjustment of standing deci-
sions as long as there are still parties who are better off without the adjustment.
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space for innovative solutions must rapidly shrink as the number and variety of
veto-positions increases.3 Deferential Adjustment is able to avoid disturbances
and losses, but it is not, by itself, able to approximate the welfare optimum.
2.3 Varieties of Negotiated Coordination
Thus, Lindblom’s welfare theoretic claims appear questionable for both4 of the
"adaptive" variants of Partisan Mutual Adjustment. But that may not be equally
true of "Manipulative Adjustment", or at least not of those variants which, in
one way or another, involve negotiations and binding agreements. Lindblom
distinguishes between "Negotiation", "Bargaining", "Partisan Discussion", "Com-
pensation" and "Reciprocity".5 All of these modes provide for coordination
through voluntary agreement, which can only be expected when all parties can
expect to be better off than they would be without the agreement. Under such
conditions, coordination is indeed likely to produce positive welfare effects for
participants - and according to the "Coase Theorem" (which Lindblom does not
mention) outcomes may systematically approximate the utilitarian welfare
optimum (Coase 1960), provided that they are divisible and transferrable, or
that side payments or package deals are possible (Scharpf 1992b). Depending
3 With two actors, orthogonal preference vectors, and policy options randomly
distributed in Euclidian space, the probability that a proposal that is attractive
to one side will be rejected by the other side, is p = 1/2. With three actors, the
probability of agreement is reduced to p = 1/4, and with n actors it shrinks to
p = 1/2(n-1).
4 We do not discuss here the theoretically less interesting mixed form of "Calculat-
ed Adaptive Adjustment".
5 In addition, the rubric of "Manipulated Adjustment" is to include "Authoritarian
Prescription" and "Unconditional Manipulation" (i.e. direct and indirect forms
of hierarchical control), as well as "Prior Decision" (i.e. exploiting the advantage
of the first move in a sequential, noncooperative game) and "Indirect Manipula-
tion" (i.e. prevailing on a third party to use its influence on the target actors).
Analytically, this is an extremely heterogeneous list whose diverse welfare
implications cannot be fully explored here. If he had thought that hierarchical
coordination were generally efficient, Lindblom would have written a different
book (Miller 1992). "Prior Decision" seems to be a less myopic variant of "Para-
metric Adjustment" discussed above. Its implications are highly contingent on
the nature of the game, however. Having the first move in a sequential game
is an advantage if the game has multiple Nash equilibria, it is irrelevant if the
game has precisely one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and it is a disadvan-
tage in mixed-motive games without a Nash equilibrium or in zero-sum games
without a saddle point. "Indirect Manipulation", finally, does not seem to have
any specific consequences of welfare-theoretic interest.
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on the allocation of property rights, either winners could compensate losers
if aggregate gains are higher than aggregate costs; or potential victims could
pay for the avoidance of initiatives whose aggregate costs exceed aggregate
benefits. Of course, distributional consequences would differ - but in both cases
all initiatives, and only those initiatives, which increase net aggregate welfare,
would be realized through negotiated coordination.
However, the Coase Theorem is not only insensitive to distributional issues,
but it also presupposes complete information and negligible transaction costs -
and its welfare-theoretic conclusions are highly sensitive to real-world depar-
tures from these idealized conditions.6 Moreover, the different variants of nego-
tiated coordination seem to be affected in different ways and to different de-
grees by the obstacles to agreement encountered in real-world decision process-
es. In order to discuss these differences, however, Lindblom’s phenomenological
categories appear to be less useful than a theoretically derived classification
which is based on the two crucial dimensions of the negotiation problem: Nego-
tiated coordination enables actors to create value (or to avoid losses), either
through cooperating on the production of new goods or through the (utility-
increasing) exchange of existing goods (the dimension of "value creation"). At
the same time, parties must also agree on how to divide the value so created,
and how to allocate the costs of joint action among themselves - either by
choosing among several coordinated solutions available or by defining appro-
priate side payments (the dimension of "distribution").
Logically, all negotiations can be characterized in both of these dimensions
(Walton/ McKersie 1965; Lax/ Sebenius 1986). But both dimensions will not
be equally salient in all negotiations - which also means that different types
of disagreement will have to be overcome in the individual case. This will, in
turn, determine the procedures that must, at a minimum, be employed to reach
successful coordination through negotiations.7 When value-creation is at issue,
6 In the absence of transaction costs, for instance, there would be no reason to
consider external effects as a problem, since all parties affected could participate
in negotiations leading to an agreed decision. By contrast, if transaction costs
matter, the inevitable non-identity between those who are able to participate in
a decision, and those who are affected by it, must become the core problem of
normative political theory. By the same token, the problems associated with the
"logic of collective action" (Olson 1965) and empirical differences in the capacity
of interests to achieve collective organization, derive their political salience entire-
ly from the real-world importance of transaction costs.
7 There is, of course, no suggestion here that negotiations should be the only
means available for achieving coordination in the face of distribution and value-
creation problems. Hierarchical fiat, majority vote, or noncooperative games may
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new solutions must be invented and comparatively evaluated in terms of their
effectiveness and costs; when distribution is in dispute, the justification of com-
peting claims must be discussed in the light of accepted standards of distribu-
tive justice. It thus seems promising to use the salience of potential disagree-
ment over value-creation and over distribution for a systematic classification
of types of negotiations. They will here be labeled "Negative Coordination",
"Bargaining", "Problem Solving" and "Positive Coordination" (Diagram 1).














The first field is meant to describe minimal negotiations in which neither issues
of joint production nor issues of distribution are of high salience, but where
agreement is nevertheless necessary. This is true in market exchanges when
a well-defined product is offered at a fixed price, leaving the buyer only the
choice of accepting or rejecting it with a view to her own interests. It is also
true, however, in a form of "Deferential Adjustment", discussed above, where
the occupant of a veto position must explicitly agree to let a policy initiative
pass. As in market exchanges, negotiations may be quite rudimentary, since
they will be about a well-defined object (e.g., a policy initiative pursued by one
of the parties, in which others are not expected to take an intrinsic interest).
Since the exercise of a veto will simply end this particular transaction, there
is also no incentive to dissimulate circumstances or motives. As a consequence,
the transaction costs of pure Negative Coordination may be minimal - all that
is needed is to check for agreement or vetoes which, in either case, will bring
the interaction to an end. But, for the reasons discussed above, if transaction
do as well or even better in some situations.
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costs are minimal, so are the welfare gains that can be expected if this form
of coordination is practiced exclusively.
2.3.2. Bargaining8
The second field is the location of negotiations dominated by distributional
issues, in which problems of value creation play little or no role. In market
exchanges, this would apply to the purchase of an existing object - a house or
a work of art - which is unique, so that its price must be determined through
bargaining among the parties. Other examples may be collective bargaining
over wages, but also many political compromises in which it is expected that
the outcome will be an "intermediate" solution between the extreme positions
championed by the parties. Similarly, the Nash bargaining solution and its
variants (Nash 1953; Kalai/ Smorodinsky 1975; Rubinstein 1982) presuppose
the existence of a given production possibility frontier which is not itself the
object of negotiations. In any case, Bargaining is focused entirely on the distrib-
utional issue (Diagram 2).
From a welfare theoretical point of view, the great advantage that Bargaining
has over Negative Coordination arises from the possibility of compensation.
Solutions are not automatically ruled out when they seem to violate the status-
quo interests of one of the parties. Thus, in Diagram 2, if actor Y proposes
solution A (which, by itself, would be completely unacceptable to actor X), an
agreement can still be reached through side payments from Y to B, which will
in effect transform solution A into solution B, to which X would have no reason
to object. As a consequence, bargaining processes can potentially reach any
solution that lies on the utility isoquant of a given proposal - provided that the
parties are able to reach agreement on the distributional issue. This may be
difficult, since both sides will have incentives to dissimulate factors affecting
their valuation of the outcome - but when it is simply a case of buying off a
potential veto through the compensation of expected damages, transaction costs
may nevertheless remain within manageable bounds.
8 In the terminology of Walton and McKersie (1965), this would be "distributive
bargaining".





Bargaining over Divisible Outcomes (SQ = Status Quo)
Diagram 2: Bargaining
2.3.3 Problem Solving9
The third field of Diagram 1 represents "cooperation" in its pure form. Here,
actors are somehow able to concentrate on issues of joint production, and to
put distributive issues aside at least temporarily. If the focus is on the compara-
tive evaluation of available solutions, the criterion is their contribution to the
common or aggregate interest of all participants; but even more important will
be the common search for new solutions that will extend the possibility frontier
- without regard for their distributional consequences. In Diagram 3, therefore,
both parties would join in the search for the welfare-maximizing solution B,
even though its realization would leave X worse off than solution A.
These may appear to be highly idealistic stipulations - which is why the possi-
bility of Problem Solving is often dismissed as practically irrelevant by social
scientists committed to a rational-actor perspective. But that conclusion appears
9 "Integrative Bargaining" is the term used by Walton and McKersie (1965) while
Lindblom (1965: 28) describes this mode as "Cooperative Discussion" - whose
practical relevance he considers to be marginal at best.
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Problem Solving  (SQ = Status Quo)
Diagram 3: Problem Solving
distributional issues are quite irrelevant. Sometimes, they are effectively neutral-
ized by prior agreement on explicit rules for the allocation of costs and benefits.
This is the typical case in joint ventures, which are based on elaborate contracts
settling all sorts of distributive issues in advance just in order to facilitate unin-
hibited cooperation within the common undertaking. Similarly, in the Swiss
federal government a fixed allocation of ministerial positions to a set of political
parties tends to immunize "consociational" cooperation even against the distrib-
utional conflicts arising from electoral competition (Lehmbruch 1967; Bogdanor
1988). Examples in other areas are easy to find.
Another condition facilitating Problem Solving is the "veil of ignorance". It is
well illustrated in a case study of successful research collaboration among firms
which became feasible only after it had become clear that all of the competitors
were as yet very far from the point where they might have marketable products
to introduce (Lütz 1993; Häusler/ Hohn/ Lütz 1993). Similarly, technical stan-
dardization by committees in telecommunication is relatively easy to achieve
for technologies which have not yet been introduced, but extremely difficult
when competing solutions are already on the market, so that their producers
would benefit or suffer when one or the other were adopted as a common
standard (Schmidt/ Werle 1992).
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Problem Solving also occurs within organizations, where the personal self-inter-
est of staff members is largely neutralized when the actions required occur
within the "area of acceptance" or "zone of indifference" specified by the em-
ployment relation (Simon 1957; 1991; March/ Simon 1958). Similarly, corporate
actors involved in policy networks may also engage in processes of Problem
Solving governed by notions of public interest or "systemic rationality" as long
as their own institutional self-interest is not challenged in the process. As
Renate Mayntz has shown, this was true of the role of the large West German
research organizations in the transformation of the East German Academy of
Sciences (Mayntz 1994).
In short, therefore, Problem Solving is by no means a rare and exotic mode of
coordination that could be safely dismissed in realistic analyses of real-world
negotiations. True, its practice does depend on specific preconditions which
are neither ubiquitous nor easily created where they do not exist. But they do
occur quite frequently, and where they do exist, the search for welfare-maximiz-
ing solutions can be immensely facilitated by negotiations in which distributive
conflict is not a major obstacle to agreement.10
2.3.4 Positive Coordination
The fourth field in Diagram 1, finally, describes negotiations in which partici-
pants must simultaneously solve production problems and resolve conflicts over
distribution. Mayntz and Scharpf identified this mode in their study of interde-
partmental task forces in the German federal bureaucracy, whose members were
supposed to develop innovative policy solutions for problems cutting across
several ministerial portfolios, but were at the same time expected to protect
the domain interests of their respective home departments (Mayntz and Scharpf
1975). In their view, this was the most desirable and, at the same time, the most
difficult form of coordination actually practiced in policy processes.
The difficulties result from the contradictory nature of the functions which must
be simultaneously performed. In Diagram 4, they are represented by moves
in orthogonal directions. If attention is focused on distributional issues, parties
concentrating on their most preferred solutions A or B may not even perceive
of the overall superior solution C. It will not come into view unless it is realized
10 None of this should imply, however, that Problem Solving will necessarily be
harmonious. Cognitive disagreement over cause-and-effect hypotheses or norma-
tive disagreement over the appropriate definition of organizational goals or the
public interest may be as severe, or more severe, than distributional conflict over
personal or institutional self-interest could be.
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that the pursuit of maximal advantage is ultimately pointless, since an equitable
division will be the precondition of agreement in any case. Once this is accept-
ed, it will be obvious that solution C may be better even from a self-interested
point of view than the inevitable compromise between A and B.
What stands in the way of agreement is, however, not only a cognitive problem.
As long as negotiations are dominated by attention to distributive issues, suc-
cess will in fact be facilitated by "playing one’s cards close to one’s chest", by
understating one’s own interest in an agreed-on solution, and by manipulating
information about the likely consequences of different solutions. Such strata-
gems, however, are objectively incompatible with the joint search for superior
solutions, which can only succeed if communication is open and information
freely exchanged. Worse yet, parties who are actively engaged in the search
for common advantage are most likely to be exploited by partners who are
primarily trying to maximize their own shares. This is the core of the "negotia-
tion dilemma" (Lax/ Sebenius 1986) which often leads to the failure of Positive
Coordination. If it is to be overcome, parties not only must develop mutual
trust in the face of ubiquitous opportunities for deception, but they must also
agree on fair rules of distribution and their application to the case at hand
(Scharpf 1992b).
Thus it may seem that we have finally discovered a general mechanism which
would permit pluralist polities to maximize their common welfare even when
all parties involved are pursuing their own, self-interested goals, rather than
the public interest. Unfortunately, however, the welfare-theoretic argument
holds only for those corporate actors who in fact participate in policy negotia-
tions, and for the interests represented by them. Because of the difficulties of
reaching agreement in the first place, external effects are even more likely to
be ignored by negotiating groups of self-interested actors than by self-interested
individual actors. Thus, unless all affected interests are in fact represented, there
is again no assurance that Positive Coordination by itself will increase, rather
than reduce, general welfare. And even if we restrict attention to only those
interests which are in fact represented in pluralist policy networks, relegating
those who are excluded to other representational mechanisms,11 the welfare-
theoretical attractiveness of the solution is undercut by the escalating transac-
tions costs as the number of participants increases.
11 Regardless of all normative advantages of pluralist and corporatist interest inter-
mediation, universal suffrage remains the only truly egalitarian representational
mechanism - and the political process will approximate egalitarian outcomes only
to the extent that the relative weight of general elections remains high in compar-
ison to other forms of political influence (Scharpf 1970).
Scharpf, Mohr: Efficient Self-Coordination 21






Positive Coordination (SQ = Status Quo)
Diagram 4: Positive Coordination
ists requires costly investments in trustworthiness; it takes time to develop, and
it is easily destroyed (Sabel 1993; Scharpf 1993). And even if all parties should
refrain from deception, they will find it difficult to achieve simultaneous agree-
ment on the solution which is best for all, and on the fair distribution of bene-
fits and costs. Moreover, these transaction costs will increase exponentially, not
proportionately, with the number of parties participating in negotiations. If each
of N participants has S options to choose from, search for the overall optimal
solution requires the comparison of SN outcomes, and agreement on a fair
distribution involves the examination of N(N-1)/2 bilateral relationships. By
comparison, the transaction costs of Negative Coordination are much lower:
Each party needs to be concerned only with its own options and with its own
benefits and costs, and whoever takes the initiative to change the status quo
needs only to check with (N-1) other parties to see whether a veto will be exer-
cised. The implication is that Negative Coordination may indeed be practical
among relatively large numbers of participants, while Positive Coordination
is not feasible beyond limits which, though hard to define with any precision,
are bound to be very narrow.12
12 The problem of prohibitive transaction costs seems to be acknowledged by Lind-
blom when he points out that the number of participants in negotiations must
necessarily be very limited. In his view, therefore, the main burden of coordina-
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Thus we seem to have not come very far in our search for the welfare potential
of pluralist policy networks. Parametric Adjustment in sequential noncoopera-
tive games is likely to lead to unstable constellations, and may end in social
traps (but see, above, footnote 1). And Negative Coordination, while protecting
status quo interests, is hostile to welfare gains that can only be realized through
policy innovation. Bargaining has a somewhat greater welfare potential when
negotiations are merely about the costs and benefits of predefined solutions.
Problem Solving, on the other hand, is highly effective in defining innovative
welfare maximizing solutions, but it depends crucially on the neutralization
of distributive issues. Finally, both of these constraints are relaxed in Positive
Coordination which, like Problem Solving, would allow participants to pursue
their common interest to the fullest degree. However, the number of possible
participants is constrained by escalating transaction costs. Hence Positive Coor-
dination is likely to be practiced among small numbers of active participants.
As a consequence, there may be significant external effects, and welfare gains
obtained by participants may under certain conditions be more than offset by
the damage done to the interests of outsiders.
In reaching these skeptical conclusions, we have considered each of these coor-
dination mechanisms separately. In doing so, however, we may not have done
justice to the spirit of Lindblom’s work, in which the welfare effects of "Partisan
Mutual Adjustment" are discussed without actually distinguishing among its
different variants. That may be criticized as a lack of analytical precision, but
it may also be interpreted as an implicit13 suggestion that, in combination,
the several coordinating mechanisms might have more attractive welfare conse-
quences than each of them has when applied in isolation. In the remainder of
this paper we will pursue this suggestion for constellations in which Positive
Coordination, Negative Coordination, and Bargaining are jointly applied to
solve a given coordination problem. In order to do so, one of us has developed
a computer simulation program which allows us to determine the welfare
effects (defined by the influence on the joint payoffs of all participants) of differ-
ent types of negotiation procedures. In the following section, we will provide
a brief description of the characteristic features and results of the simulation.
tion has to be borne by "Parametric Adjustment" and "Deferential Adjustment"
(1965: 68). But that throws us back to the welfare deficits discussed above.
13 In his discussion of "parametric adjustment" Lindblom explicitly suggests that,
when one form of coordination fails, actors might switch to another: "The coordi-
nating potential of the various mutual adjustment processes may be greater than
is at first supposed, since in these processes themselves are opportunities for
participants to choose one or another of quit different methods, as circumstances
require" (1965: 41). This seems plausible, but is different from the combination
effects discussed here.
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3 The Simulation Program
We use computer simulation not in order to model particular processes of
interdependent policy choices under conditions approaching real-world constel-
lations, but in order to clarify the general characteristics of the methods of
coordination discussed above, and of their combinations. Conceivably, this
clarification could also be achieved more elegantly by analytical means, and
we certainly hope that some of our results will eventually be confirmed analyti-
cally. But we know of no analytical procedures that would permit us, at this
stage of our work, to vary assumptions as flexibly, and to explore such a variety
of stipulated conditions, as is possible with simulation methods. Thus, without
further excuses, we proceeed to present our basic simulation model.14
In one sense, our model is deliberately unrealistic: it represents the horror
world of total interdependence - a world which Herbert Simon (1962) had
promised we would never have to face. Each of N actors is able to choose
among S policy options15, and each choice will affect the payoffs of all actors
at the same time. If a method of coordination succeeds here, it will succeed
more easily under the more benign conditions of selective interdependence.
Moreover, the interdependence among policy choices is unstructered, since our
model uses random payoff matrices of size SN rather than matrices representing
certain types of well-known game constellations16. Payoffs are assumed to
be interpersonally comparable, measurable in a general medium of exchange,
such as money, and transferrable if required17. Games are played sequential-
ly,18 and players are assumed to be myopic in the sense defined above in the
exposition of Lindblom’s Parametric Adjustment. They will respond to other
14 A more complete description, and a copy of the program, written in Turbo Pascal
and running on IBM compatible 386 PCs, can be obtained from Matthias Mohr.
15 These "options" are not "strategies" in the game-theoretic sense of a complete
specification of moves in a sequential game. Instead, they are meant to represent
specific policy stances among which a particular actor in a policy network may
choose - such as between cutting the budget, raising taxes, or increased borrow-
ing.
16 We have also experimented with matrices structured so as to represent specific
types of game constellations, but have chosen to present here only the general
case.
17 For all examples presented here, the random payoffs are distributed identically
in the interval [0...100].
18 Since switching back to an earlier option in later stages of the game is not pre-
cluded, it is necessary, for each method of coordination, to define the point at
which a particular sequence of moves will come to an end. Choices of options
become final only at this point.
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players’ moves, but cannot anticipate them; and in selecting their own moves,
they will always pick the one that would give them the highest payoff, if no
other player should move again.19
Table 1 illustrates these assumptions in a form of presentation that allows the
direct inspection and analysis of fairly large n-person games in normal form.
It represents a game with four players, each of whom has two options, labeled
1 or 2. Each row stands for a cell of the payoff matrix, which is defined by a
combination of options producing an outcome consisting of a set of individual
payoffs (varying between 0 and 100). Players’ choices are driven by the (myo-
pic) maximization of individual payoffs, but since we are exploring welfare
effects of various types of negotiations, our attention is focused on the aggregate
or joint payoffs represented in the last column. Thus, the relative success of a
coordination method is judged by the location of the outcome in the solution
space between the joint payoff minimum (cell 8) and the joint payoff maximum
(cell 4). In order to achieve comparability, joint payoffs are normalized to a
range between 0 and 1 in all later presentations.
Another characteristic that departs from the usual game-theoretic conventions
is the fact that all our simulation runs must start from a specific "status quo"
cell, and that outcomes must be reached through sequential moves from this
point of departure. In the present article, simulations will either start from the
cell representing the joint payoff minimum or from a cell selected at random.
3.1 Parametric Adjustment
In order to simulate Lindblom’s version of a noncooperative sequential game,
the first move is assigned to the player who could achieve the largest individual
gain through a unilateral switch from her status-quo policy position on the
assumption that all other players would meanwhile stick to their own status-
quo positions. This move then defines a new point of departure to which other
players will now respond. Again, the player who can now expect the greatest
individual gain will move, and again other players will respond to the new
situation, and so on. The sequential noncooperative game will stop under one
of two conditions: On the one hand, it is possible that a cell will be reached
19 Maximax, rather than Minimax, makes sense as a rule for myopic players who
must choose one move at a time (rather than complete strategies) and who are
ignorant of the options as well as of the preferences of other players. The risks
are minimized in a sequential game in which a player may respond again to
other players’ responses to her own move.
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which represents a Nash equilibrium, i.e. an outcome in which no player could
Table 1: Random Payoffs, 4 Players, 2 Options
Cell Option of Player
A B C D
Payoff for Player
A B C D
Joint Payoffs Normalized
Joint Payoffs
1 1 1 1 1 20 69 46 18 153 0.20
2 2 1 1 1 97 29 52 00 178 0.35
3 1 2 1 1 73 25 37 00 135 0.10
4 2 2 1 1 73 76 99 38 286 1.00
5 1 1 2 1 48 23 79 98 248 0.77
6 2 1 2 1 42 60 60 31 193 0.44
7 1 2 2 1 97 69 33 26 225 0.63
8 2 2 2 1 22 10 50 37 119 0.00
9 1 1 1 2 94 08 05 37 144 0.15
10 2 1 1 2 24 71 31 34 160 0.25
11 1 2 1 2 94 99 03 05 201 0.49
12 2 2 1 2 51 81 11 20 163 0.26
13 1 1 2 2 18 25 29 60 132 0.08
14 2 1 2 2 88 87 07 16 198 0.47
15 1 2 2 2 35 26 63 12 136 0.10
16 2 2 2 2 96 80 47 04 227 0.65
still improve her own payoff by a unilateral change of policy. On the other
hand, if no equilibrium is reached, moves will continue until a cell is reached
that was touched before with the same player being in the position to move -
at which point the game moves into an infinite cycle and the simulation breaks
off. In this case, we arbitrarily assign status quo payoffs to the outcome.20
In our example, player A would initially move the game from cell 1 to cell 2.
Thereafter, player B would have most to gain by moving the game to cell 4 -
which would also benefit players C and D, but would reduce the payoff of
player A. However, neither A nor any other player could still improve her
payoff by unilaterally changing her own option. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is
reached which, incidentally, also represents the welfare maximum. But, of
course, this is a not a representative example.
20 Alternatively, players with perfect recall might then backtrack to a non-equilibri-
um but pareto-superior cell touched earlier during the sequence of moves. This
is a possibility that we have not modelled.
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3.2 Negative Coordination
Negative Coordination (or "Deferential Adjustment" in Lindblom’s terminology)
also begins with a first move by the player who has most to gain. But that
move can only be completed if it is not vetoed by another player who would
be made worse off in comparison to the status quo. In other words, whoever
has the right of initiative cannot impose negative externalities on others. If no
veto is exercised, the game moves to the new cell and continues from there.
Otherwise, the leading player will try her next best move, and so on, until the
game comes to a stop. Thus, in Table 1, player A would have most to gain by
moving the game from cell 1 to cell 2. But this move would be blocked by
players B and D, whose status quo interests would be violated.
Again, however, our example is not representative. When there are relatively
few players with relatively many options, chances are good that the leading
player will find ways to improve her own situation without damaging the
status-quo interests of any other player. This would be even more likely if the
initiative is not restricted to a single player but will shift to others when the
first one cannot succeed. If the number of options per player stays constant or
is reduced, however, while the number of players (and thus the number of veto
positions) increases, there is a much greater possibility that all initiatives will
be blocked and that the status quo cannot be left under conditions of Negative
Coordination. In any case, however, Negative Coordination will not produce
payoffs that are worse than the status quo, and any initiative that is not blocked
will lead to welfare improvements.
3.3 Bargaining
The Bargaining process begins like Negative Coordination: the player with the
most to gain makes the first move. But if she encounters one or more vetoes,
the move is not immediately withdrawn. Instead, the player determines wheth-
er her expected gain would be sufficient to (just barely) compensate those play-
ers who are objecting, so that their status quo payoffs ("reservation payoffs")
would be maintained while she herself would still make a profit. When that
is true, the move is carried out, and the game continues from the new cell -
whose payoffs are adjusted according to the outcome of the bargain. In Table
1, for instance, if the game starts in cell 1, player A would gain 77 points from
a move to cell 2. This would also improve the payoff of player C, but player
B would lose 40 points and player D would lose 18. Since the gains of player
A are sufficient to compensate these losses, the move can be completed. The
new reservation payoffs in cell 2 would now be 39, 69, 52, and 18 for players
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A, B, C, and D, respectively. Next, player D could gain 16 points by moving
to cell 10 - but that would not be enough to compensate player A for a loss
of 15 points and player C for a loss of 21 points. Player C could move to cell
6 for a gain of 8 points - which would not be enough to pay for player B’s loss
of 9 points. Finally, player B would gain only seven points from a move to cell
4, but since this move would entail large windfall profits for all others, it would
be carried out. Beyond that, no player could make a profit by moving away
from cell 4 which, incidentally, is also the welfare optimum.
3.4 Problem Solving and Positive Coordination
Both Problem Solving and Positive Coordination are here defined as methods
for maximizing the collective payoff of coalitions of self-interested players.21
They differ only in the distributive dimension - which is treated as being irrele-
vant for Problem Solving, and highly relevant for Positive Coordination. In the
simulation program, coalitions are formed incrementally. The nucleus is again
the individual player who has most to gain. She will then join forces with a
second player who, when options are pooled, will allow the pair to achieve
the largest additional gain,22 and so on.
21 Renate Mayntz (1993a; 1994) equates Problem Solving with "system rationality".
Translated into our simulation model, this would mean that the members of a
coalition are always aspiring to maximize the joint payoffs of the whole population
of players, regardless of payoffs achieved by themselves (or, alternatively, provid-
ed that their own status-quo interests are not violated). In doing so, they could
still use only the moves available to coalition members - and they might need
to play a non-cooperative game against players not included in the coalition. In
the present paper, we have not explored this variant of coordination mechanisms.
22 It should be clear that these are assumptions, rather than deductions from a ration-
al-choice theory of coalition formation. According to these assumptions, coalition
partners will be selected by the criterion of maximally convergent or harmonious
interests (i.e. coalitions should coopt their closest friends, which corresponds to
Fritz Heider’s theory of "structural balance" - Cartwright/ Harary 1956). This
is not the only plausible assumption, however. When outsiders can interfere with
its strategies (or have a veto), a given coalition might do better by coopting
potential opponents, rather than close friends.
In a well-researched historical example, that was the logic of Bismarck’s
system of criss-crossing alliances. But since it was a very difficult system to
manage, his successors in the 1890s regressed to the more harmonious "Triple
Alliance" of Germany, Austria and Italy - whose confrontation with the "Triple
Entente" of England, France and Russia then defined the lineup of World War
I (McDonald/ Rosecrance 1985).
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Two points are important to note. First, by pooling their policy options,23 the
members of a coalition can significantly increase the action space available to
themselves. Thus, starting from cell 1 in Table 1, player C would only have the
option of moving to cell 5, and player D could only reach cell 9. A coalition
of players C and D, however, could use these options of their individual mem-
bers and, in addition, could also reach cell 13 by combining both these moves.
More generally, from any given status quo, a coalition of N members with S
policy options each can reach a set of SN−1 different outcomes while a populati-
on of uncoordinated indidividual actors of the same size could only reach
(S−1)N outcomes.
Second, in Problem Solving, the coalition’s only criterion of choice is the aggre-
gate net gain of the group. Individual losses are not compensated. Thus, in
Table 1, the coalition of players 3 and 4 could obtain the maximum total gain
of 113 points by moving to cell 5. Player C would collect 33 points, while 80
points would fall to player D. In Positive Coordination, by contrast, additional
distributive negotiations are needed to allocate gains and losses among the
members of the coalition. These are more demanding than the distributive
negotiations involved in the Bargaining simulation. There, the player who
proposes a solution is also the "residual claimant" who will keep the remaining
profit after having paid minimal compensation to those other players who
would otherwise suffer losses compared to their reservation payoffs. Within
the coalition, however, a "fair" distribution is required for which a number of
factors will be relevant. Of course, no actor will join a coalition if it will not
at least allow her maintain her reservation payoff. Beyond this, the Nash Bar-
gaining solution would distribute profits in proportion to the status-quo payoffs
of the players involved. This is also the rule applied in our simulation mod-
el.24
In our simulations, the cooptation of opponents would increase the welfare
effectiveness of combinations of Positive and Negative Coordination. But in the
interest of comparability, the cooptation of friends was used as coalition building
rule in all examples presented below.
23 Coalitions are modeled here as a set of actors with distributed, rather than cen-
tralized, action resources - which is generally true in policy processes among
corporate actors controlling certain policy instruments.
24 Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly, distribution could be proportional
to the highest potential gain a coalition member could have achieved (Kalai/
Smorodinsky 1975). However, if utility functions are linear as in our case or if
they are identical, both concepts lead to the same solution. We have chosen the
Nash solution for pragmatic reasons since the Zeuthen-Harsanyi bargaining
procedure, which easily lends itself to simulation, produces Nash distributions
(Harsanyi 1977: 149-162, 198-203).
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However, our definitions of Problem Solving and Positive Coordination do not
yet specify a complete coordination mechanism for all cases where the coalition
is smaller than the total population of players (i.e. is not a grand coalition).
What is needed in addition is a specification of the rules governing the interac-
tion between the coalition and players outside. This relationship could be dicta-
torial in the sense that the coalition is able to prevent all other players from
responding to the coalition’s preferred move, or it could be defined by one of
the coordination mechanism discussed so far - Parametric Adjustment, Negative
Coordination and Bargaining. It is here that Lindblom’s and our hunch, accord-
ing to which combinations of coordination methods might produce particularly
attractive welfare effects, would have to be tested.
4 Comparative Welfare Effects
We have already discussed the potential welfare effects of simple coordination
mechanisms - Parametric Adjustment, Negative Coordination, and Bargaining -
and we will here merely add some more precise observations derived from our
simulation experiments. We will then present simulation results of the welfare
effects of partial coalitions, and will then proceed to the main theme of this
section, the examination of combination effects of partial coalitions and simple
coordination methods. The section will conclude with an examination of the
rise of transaction costs associated with coalitions of increasing size.
4.1 Simple Coordination Methods
As discussed above, Parametric Adjustment may in fact be the most efficient
coordination method available for certain constellations resembling games of
pure coordination or the Battle of the Sexes. In the general case, however, the
However, both rules are likely to underestimate the difficulties of agreeing
on the relevance of criteria for distribution. In Table 1, for instance, players C
and D may agree to move to cell 5 which provides them with a common surplus
of 113 points. But player C, who must produce this outcome through a change
of her own strategy (while player D remains inactive), is unlikely to forget that
she could have done even better by sitting still and letting the game move to
its noncooperative equilibrium in cell 4 - a prediction which player D might
challenge by pointing to her own threat potential, whose credibility might again
be disputed, and so on.
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probability that a Nash equilibrium can be reached at all through sequential
moves is greatly reduced as the number of options and/or the number of play-
ers increases. In order to test this intuition,25 we have conducted series26 of
100 simulation runs for games in which the number of players varied between
2 and 12, while the number of options available to each player was held con-
stant at 2. The outcome is presented in Table 2. Similarly, when we held the
number of players constant at six while varying the number of options available
to each between two and five, an equilibrium was reached in 24/100 plays
when the players had two options, but only in 4/100 cases when the number
of options was increased to five.
















25 A mathematical proof is difficult because of the path-dependent character of our
sequential games.
26 These series of simulation runs are not to be mistaken for "iterated games". We
do not assume that players anticipate future interactions or react to past experi-
ences. Thus, each run is a one-shot game, and the number of runs is increased
simply to average out the variance of individual outcomes resulting from our
use of random payoff matrices.
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When a Nash equilibrium is in fact reached, however, the outcome usually
constitutes a welfare improvement over the status quo27 - but not invariably
so. In a series of 60 simulation runs of a 3-players-by-3-options game, Nash
equilibria were reached in 28 cases. Of these, 23 could be classified as welfare
improvements, but in five cases, aggregate payoffs were in fact lower than in
the status quo. This is a reminder that even in nonstructured (randomized)
game constellations, players may encounter situations resembling a social trap -
and that sequential, noncooperative games among three or more players do
not provide protection against the "lock in" on inferior solutions.
Our simulations have also confirmed the expectation that the welfare efficiency
of Negative Coordination will decline as the number of independent players in
veto positions increases. Table 3 summarizes the normalized joint-payoff gains
of thirty simulation runs in which Negative Coordination is applied among
4, 8, and 12 players respectively, each of whom is provided with a choice
among two options.
Table 3: Average Joint-Payoff Gains Through Negative Coordination
Number of Players




Random Selection 0.13 0.02 0.00
The table also shows that gains are higher if the simulation departs from a
status-quo situation in which joint payoffs are at a minimum than if the status
quo is selected by random choice. In the first case, when most players will also
start from low individual payoffs, moves that will improve the outcome for
the leading player are less likely to be blocked by vetoes. When the initial status
quo is selected at random however, it is more likely that any move that would
improve one player’s payoff will violate the vested interests of others.
27 That is so because we use a random payoff matrix. While players moves will
improve their own payoffs, the external effects on the outcomes of other players
may be positive or negative.
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Since Bargaining is in all respects similar to Negative Coordination, except that
vetoes may be bought off, the outcomes show a similar tendency (Table 4).
However, the level of gains that can be achieved is generally higher, since some
profitable moves can be carried out here, while they would have been blocked
under Negative Coordination.
Table 4: Average Joint-Payoff Gains Through Bargaining
Number of Players




Random Selection 0.28 0.07 0.00
4.2 Partial (Dictatorial) Coalitions
When a coalition that is practicing Positive Coordination (or Problem Solving,
for that matter) internally, can impose its preferred outcome on all other play-
ers, there is, of course, no question that the collective welfare of coalition mem-
bers will be maximized. And there is also no question that a grand coalition
that includes all affected parties would maximize aggregate welfare. But, as
will be shown below, transaction costs of coalitions rise steeply as the number
of members increases. As a consequence, coalitions are likely to be quite small,
and the welfare consequences of small coalitions may be quite problematic. This
is illustrated in Diagram 5.
The Diagram shows the normalized joint payoffs of three individual simulation
runs of a game with eight players and three options. The status quo cells were
selected at random for each run. The lines represent the joint payoffs (aggregat-
ed over all players) achieved by self-interested coalitions of varying sizes (K1
to K8). Players who are not members of the coalition are here assumed to make
no moves of their own - in other words, the coalition is "dictatorial" in the sense
that it alone can exercise policy options.
Even under these unrealistic conditions, the unrestricted pursuit of self-interest
by a dictatorial individual (K1) will often reduce general welfare in comparison
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to the status quo. It is also interesting to note that, in the individual case, general
Welfare Effects of Positive Coordination
(Individual Simulation Runs, 8 Players, 3 Options)



















Run 1 Run 2 Run 3
Diagram 5: Welfare Effects of Dictatorial Coalitions
welfare will not necessarily increase if the size of the coalition increases. Thus,
in two of the three runs shown here, the move from a two-member to a three-
member coalition, and from a four-member coalition to a majority coalition
including five out of eight players, would in fact have reduced general welfare.
Since the members of the coalition are, of course, increasing their per-capita
payoff at each step, these reversals are an indication of negative externalities
which are imposed on players outside of the coalition.
The selected results of individual simulation are of course not representative.
In our randomized payoff matrices, positive and negative externalities will can-
cel out on the average, so that the aggregate result of large numbers of simula-
tion runs will show a steady increase of average joint payoffs (Diagram 6). It
is interesting to note that the choice of the status quo from which the simulation
starts (from the joint payoff minimum or from a randomized point of departure)
does not seem to make much of a difference. Even when starting from the
minimum, the first move of the leading player brings the welfare level of the
whole population up to a medium range, from where on progress tends to be
quite slow.
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Welfare Effects of Positive Coordination
(Averages of 100 Simulation Runs, 8 Players, 3 Options)
















Diagram 6: Joint Payoffs from Positive Coordination
4.3 Positive Coordination plus Parametric Adjustment
When policy options are evenly distributed, as we have assumed, dictatorial
coalitions are, of course, not a realistic proposition. We have included them for
purposes of exposition, but will in the remainder of the paper explore constella-
tions where the players outside of the coalition also have a role. At a minimum,
they should be able to exercise their own individual policy options in response
to the new situation created by the initial move of the coalition. When that is
so, we have in fact a noncooperative sequential game played between the coali-
tion and all other players. In our simulations, the coalition has the first move
and will choose its most preferred cell. Starting from there, the outside player
who has most to gain will have the next move, to which the coalition or another
player may again respond, and so on. Given its greater range of options, the
coalition will be at an advantage, but it will not be able to determine the out-
come unilaterally.
In comparison to the pure model of Parametic Adjustment discussed above,
the number of players is reduced when some of them combine to form a coali-
tion. Thus, in a constant population of players, the probability that a Nash
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equilibrium can be reached will increase as the size of the coalition increases.
When it is reached, the welfare effect is likely to be positive. But as long as the
number of independent players is larger than four or five, a Nash equilibrium
will not be reached in the majority of simulation runs. The probability that an
equilibrium will be reached decreases further when players can choose among
more than two policy options, as is true in the example presented here. Since
in the absence of an equilibrium outcome the status quo will be maintained
by definition in our simulations, the average welfare gains achieved by a combi-
nation of Positive Coordination and Deferential Adjustment will be quite mod-
est unless relatively large coalitions (implying very high transaction costs) are
formed (Diagram 7).
Positive Coordination + Parametric Adjustment
(Averages of 100 Simulation Runs, 8 Players, 3 Options)















Diagram 7: Positive Coordination plus Parametric Adjustment
4.4 Positive plus Negative Coordination
In the next variant we explore the combination of Positive Coordination and
Negative Coordination. As before, there is a coalition building process which
begins with the player who has most to gain. But now the status-quo payoffs
of all players who are not members of the leading coalition are protected (say,
by institutionalized property rights). Thus, the coalition is only able to complete
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its most preferred move if it leaves no other player worse off than in the status
quo. If its initiative is blocked, the coalition will try its second-best move. When
it is successful, or when its options are exhausted, the coalition is enlarged by
coopting the outside player whose addition promises the greatest joint gain
for the larger coalition, and so on.
As is to be expected, single actors are not doing well against a large number
Positive + Negative Coordination
(Averages of 100 Simulation Runs, 8 Players, 3 Options)















Diagram 8: Positive plus negative Coordination
of veto players. But here, having larger numbers of options is an advantage
for the leading coalition. Thus, if the game starts from the joint payoff mini-
mum, and if all players can choose among three policy options, it takes only
a two or three member coalition to bring joint payoffs up to a medium level.
However, the outcome is much less encouraging when the game starts from
a random (in the average: medium) status quo position. Here, it takes a five
or six member coalition before overall welfare increases noticeably. This sug-
gests that veto systems are least constraining when things are really bad for
everybody, while under more average conditions most proposals for change
will have negative effects on some vested interests, and thus are likely to be
blocked.
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4.5 Positive plus Negative Coordination plus Bargaining
The last coordination method to be looked at builds upon the previous one by
adding a Bargaining element to the combination of Positive Coordination and
Negative Coordination. Again, the leading coalition cannot impose negative
externalities on outsiders. But when an initiative encounters one or more vetoes,
the simulation program determines whether the potential net gains of the coali-
tion exceed the loss that would be suffered by the veto players. If not, the move
must be withdrawn as would be true under Negative Coordination. If the gain
is large enough, however, the proposed move is carried out, the reservation
payoffs of the veto players are maintained through transfer payments, and an
equal amount is deducted from the aggregate payoff of the coalition members.
As a result, coalition initiatives are more frequently successful, and joint payoffs
will rise more rapidly than they would under the combination of Positive and
Negative Coordination alone. The impact on joint payoffs is quite dramatic
(Diagram 9).
Starting from the joint payoff minimum, even a single actor can raise aggregate
Positive + Negative Coordination + Bargaining
(Averages of 100 Simulation Runs, 8 Players, 3 Options)















Diagram 9: Positive plus Negative Coordination plus Bargaining
welfare to a medium level when she is willing to engage in Bargaining. Beyond
that, both curves are close enough to be practically indistinguishable, and as
the size of the leading coalition increases, joint payoffs approach fairly rapidly
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toward the welfare maximum. Since vetos can be bought off, the location of
the status quo (minimum or random) looses its determining power.
4.6 Comparative Discussion
When we now compare the welfare effects of combinations of coordination
Comparative Welfare Effects
(SQ = Joint Payoff Minimum, 8 Players, 3 Options)















Diagram 10: Comparison of Welfare Effects when the Status Quo is at the
Joint Payoff Minimum
mechanism, our previous interpretations are confirmed. Leaving aside pure
(dictatorial) Positive Coordination as being unrealistic under most circumstanc-
es, it appears that the most complex combination of Positive Coordination with
Negative Coordination and Bargaining is generally the most welfare efficient
method. It produces consistently superior welfare effects for all sizes of leading
coalitions short of the grand coalition. This is true not only for constellations
where the actors start from the worst possible situation, the joint payoff mini-
mum (Diagram 10), but also when the process of bargaining starts from a ran-
domly selected point of departure (Diagram 11). In both cases, even two or
three member coalitions will be able to reach two thirds or three quarters of
the maximum welfare level that can be obtained by the grand coalition.
For Positive Coordination plus Negative Coordination, however, the point of
departure does make an important difference. When the actors start from a
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worst-case position, this method is almost as welfare-efficient as is the combina-
tion that includes Bargaining. But when everybody is reasonably well-off on
the average, the veto system of Negative Coordination prevents improvements
beyond the status quo. Even under those conditions, however, Positive Coordi-
nation plus Negative Coordination is more effective than the "laissez-faire"
combination of Positive Coordination and Parametric Adjustment, in which
small coalitions can pursue their own interests without exogenous constraints,
but cannot prevent the unilateral readjustment of excluded players.
Comparative Welfare Effects
(SQ = Random, 8 Players, 3 Options)















Diagram 11: Welfare Effects with Random Status Quo
These comparative results will also hold for simulation runs with larger num-
bers of options and larger numbers of players, while the combination of Positive
Coordination and Parametric Adjustment will do relatively better if the number
of players and options is reduced. What is less clear is how much these conclu-
sions will actually mean in practice. In order to approach this question, we must
now turn to the problem of transaction costs.
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4.7 Transaction Costs
Transaction costs arise when actors must search for an optimal outcome and
when the members of the leading coalition must agree on the distribution of
their net gains. We begin with a discussion of search costs. Given the conditions
of bounded rationality introduced above, players are assumed to have ex-ante
information of their own status-quo payoffs and of their own options. They
are also able to identify and compare the payoffs they receive, or would receive,
if other players or they themselves makes, or proposes, a move away from the
status quo - but they must do so at a cost. In addition, they must bargain over
the allocation of aggregate gains within a coalition.
More specifically, when a leading coalition is enlarged, it is first necessary to
identify and evaluate all outcomes that can be reached by combining the op-
tions of the members of the previous coalition with those of potential candidates
for cooptation. The best of these outcomes determines both, the membership
of the new leading coalition and its most preferred move. If Parametric Adjust-
ment is combined with Positive Coordination, all players outside of the coalition
must then respond to this move by examining their own options to see if it is
profitable for them to change their position; other players, including the leading
coalition, must then again evaluate their new options, and so on. In combina-
tions of Positive Coordination, Negative Coordination and Bargaining, on the
other hand, the best outcome obtainable by the leading coalition must be com-
pared to the reservation payoffs of all outsiders in order to determine whether
one or more of them will have reason to veto the proposal. If it is vetoed, the
leading coalition will have to determine whether its aggregate gains are suffi-
cient to compensate all losers. If not, the same procedure must be repeated for
the second-best outcome obtainable by the leading coalition (provided that it
exceeds the aggregate reservation payoffs of its members), and so on. If a profit-
able proposal is not blocked by a veto, the coalition must then distribute its
net gains (i.e. the gains remaining after all reservation payoffs have been main-
tained through side payments) among its members through processes of con-
verging offers and counter offers.
The simulation program includes an algorithm which keeps track of each step
in this series of operations (see Appendix). On the heroic assumption that each
of these steps represents the same degree of difficulty, or the same time delay,
the number of transactions is aggregated over the whole history of a coalition-
building and coordination process. In other words, the search costs associated
with Positive-plus-Negative Coordination for a leading coalition of three mem-
bers represent the cumulative costs incurred in a process that started with a
single player who then coopted a second one, etc. These costs are significantly
higher than they would have been if the process had started with a given three-
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member coalition. As a consequence, for larger leading coalitions the costs so
defined will exceed those that would be incurred by negotiations in a grand
coalition. Since we have generally characterized the transaction costs of (rela-
tively large) grand coalitions as being "prohibitive", we have set these to unity
and used them as an upper limit in Diagram 12 which also represents the wel-
fare effects of the relatively most efficient combination of Positive Coordination,
Negative Coordinaion and Bargaining.
When this Diagram is interpreted, two things must be kept in mind: First,
transaction costs are interpreted as opportunity costs of the time that must be
spent in negotiations. Since we can make no assumptions on the opportunities
that are foregone, it is even problematic to assume (as we do) that costs should
somehow be a linear function of time. Second, even though the maximum is
set to unity for both curves, it should be clear that the scale of transaction costs
is not comparable to the scale of joint payoffs. We also cannot tell at which
point the relative differences in the transaction costs of different combinations
of coordination methods will make a substantial difference in practice. All that
we can say is that the number of operations required for arriving at a coordinat-
ed solution increases exponentially as the size of leading coalitions increases,
but that it stays well below the level associated with the grand coalition when
leading coalitions remain relatively small.
In addition to search costs, the members of the leading coalition also incur
distribution costs when they must divide the net gains obtained at a particular
stage of the game. In our model, fair distributions are achieved through the
Zeuthen-Harsanyi process of "multilateral bargaining based on restricted bilater-
al bargaining" (Harsanyi 1977: 201). This means that each pair of coalition mem-
bers will, through converging offers and counter offers, move toward a (prelim-
inary) Nash distribution, and that the overall Nash solution is obtained when
all bilateral distributions are in balance. Again, the program will record the
number of offers needed, and compute an aggregate measure representing the
transaction costs of distribution. These costs also increase exponentially with
the size of the leading coalition. Examples are presented in the Appendix. Un-
fortunately, however, search costs and distribution costs are not directly compa-
rable and hence cannot be aggregated to a single overall measure of transaction
costs.
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Welfare Effects and Search Costs
(SQ = Random, 8 Players, 3 Options)
















Diagram 12: Search Costs and Welfare Effects
5 Conclusions
If we now return to the questions from which we departed, it is clear that
computer simulations of games defined by randomized payoff matrices are far
removed from the actual practices of real-world policy networks. For this we
make no excuses, since it has been our aim to clarify analytically some underly-
ing tendencies, opportunities and difficulties, rather than to develop a realistic
model of a specific negotiation situation. Within these limitations, however,
our simulation analyses have confirmed the intuition that combinations of
simple coordination mechanisms may have more attractive welfare effects than
each of these mechanisms does when applied alone.28 More specifically, we
can now make the following assertions with greater confidence than before:
28 It may be useful to point out the difference between this proposition and the
claim of Farrell and Saloner (1988) that technical standardization may be best
achieved by a combination of coordination through committees and coordination
through the market. In our terminology, the "committee" would be a grand coali-
tion, and the "market" would be the equivalent of Parametric Adjustment. Thus,
Farrell and Saloner suggest that members of a potential grand coalition might
exit the coalition and play a noncooperative game against the remaining mem-
bers - and they expect that this threat may facilitate agreement within the grand
coalition. This is a constellation that we have not modelled.
Scharpf, Mohr: Efficient Self-Coordination 43
(1) The Coase Theorem shows that, in the absence of transaction costs, negoti-
ations (i.e., Positive Coordination) within a grand coalition that includes
all members of a given population would reach the same welfare maxi-
mum as a benevolent and omniscient dictator could. But if, as Coase has
pointed out, grand coalitions must, beyond a relatively small group size,
run into prohibitive transaction costs, there is a premium on coordination
mechanisms that will achieve relatively high welfare gains without coali-
tions or with partial coalitions of relatively small size.
(2) On the other hand, we have shown that two simple coordination mecha-
nisms which altogether avoid coalitions, and on which Lindblom had
placed high hopes - namely Parametric Adjustment and Negative Coordi-
nation (Deferential Adjustment) - will not, by themselves, be able to attain
high welfare levels for the population as a whole in the general case.
Coalitions thus seem to be a necessary element, under most conditions,
of efficient solutions to the coordination problem.
(3) However, when relatively small leading coalitions are interacting with
the rest of the population in a noncooperative game (i.e., Positive Coordi-
nation plus Parametric Adjustment), the welfare consequences are also
unattractive. Welfare gains that could be achieved by Positive Coordina-
tion within the coalition are partly wiped out through the countermoves
of outsiders except when the leading coalition is fairly large relative to
the total population (implying high transaction costs). Thus, the most
laissez-faire form of coordination, in which both small coalitions and
individual actors are pursuing self-interested goals in the absence of for-
mal constraints, is also not an efficient solution.
(4) It seems therefore that the need to achieve agreement with outsiders,
through Negative Coordination and Bargaining, is an essential element
of any efficient solution. When individual actors and coalitions are con-
strained to avoid negative externalities on outsiders, their search for self-
interest maximizing solutions will necessarily increase general welfare
at the same time - and the same is true to an even greater extent when
transfer payments permit welfare-improving solutions to be realized even
when negative externalities (which are smaller than the potential gains)
are present.
The conclusion is, therefore, that even though the welfare maximum could only
be obtained by the all-inclusive grand coalition, the combination of Positive
Coordination, practiced within relatively small leading coalitions, and Negative
Coordination or Bargaining with the remaining members of the population,
is able to achieve intermediate levels of general welfare relatively efficiently.
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In that sense, therefore, our simulation study supports Lindblom’s optimistic
expectation that, in the absence of a well-informed and public-spirited central
coordinator, and even in the absence of individual and corporate actors who
are primarily motivated by the public interest or by considerations of "system
rationality", negotiated self-coordination in policy networks may improve the
level of general welfare.
It is necessary, however, to emphasize two structural preconditions on which
this optimistic expectation depends: First, we have modeled constellations in
which action resources are not collectivized or centralized, but distributed
among individual actors. Second, unless the total population of actors is very
small, successful self-coordination presupposes a division between a leading
coalition whose members are willing and able to practice Positive Coordination
internally, and the remaining population of interdependent actors. Third, there
must be an exogenous29 rule according to which the status-quo interests of
any actor cannot be invaded without her consent. These institutional precondi-
tions are by no means ubiquitous (thus we are far from asserting the benevo-
lence of an institution-free "invisible hand"), but they are not infrequently ap-
proximated, not only in the private-law world of contracts and torts, but in
public-sector policy processes as well.
One example is provided by the institutional circumstances in which Mayntz
and Scharpf (1975) first discovered the coexistence of Positive and Negative
Coordination: bureaucratic policy making in a government where policy respon-
sibilities are distributed among ministries, and where the Cabinet will not ratify
policy initiatives in the face of unresolved interdepartmental conflict. Another
example is the present system of policy-making within the European Union,
where the Commission is free to develop its policy initiatives in intense negotia-
tions with a small set of interested member states, but must ultimately respect
the veto positions of practically all other member states when ratification in
the Council is required (Héritier 1993; Tsebelis 1992). Structurally similar condi-
tions exist within the committee system of the United States Congress which
Lindblom had in mind when he discussed the virtues of "Partisan Mutual Ad-
justment". Many similar examples can easily be found.
However, one further caveat is in order. Our analysis throughout was based
on the assumption that all actors are maximizing their own self-interest. This
seems like a pessimistic assumption when contrasted to postulates of solidaristic
29 The rule may emerge endogenously in a history of interactions among interde-
pendent and self-interested actors (Scharpf 1993), but it is exogenous to the spe-
cific interaction at hand.
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or public-spirited action orientations. But it is also an extremely optimistic
assumption when the real possibility of competitive ("relative-gains") or even
hostile orientations is considered (Scharpf 1989; 1990; Grieco et al. 1993; Keck
1993). That such orientations can prevent negotiated self-coordination is illus-
trated not only by the conflicts in Northern Ireland or in the former Yugoslavia,
but also in the German political system under conditions of divided control,
where one of the two major parties is in control of the Bundestag while the
other one controls a majority of Laender votes in the Bundesrat. When that is
the case, the relative-gains logic of party-political competition interferes with
the self-interested give-and-take that ordinarily characterizes federal-state and
state-state Bargaining (Scharpf 1994). Under such conditions the welfare benefits
of negotiated self-coordination are hard to realize.
Finally, we should also point out that our simulation only provides a model
of coordination in situations where welfare improvements over the status quo
are possible. We cannot draw any conclusions for constellations in which inevi-
table welfare losses must be accommodated (which may increasingly be the
situation facing highly industrialized western democracies). Our hunch is that
in these situations veto systems, regardless of whether vetoes can be bought
off or not, will be less able to minimize the overall loss than systems in which
unilateral action is unconstrained (Positive Coordination plus Parametric Ad-
justment). But since we have not yet modeled such constellations, we are unable
to test this hunch.
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6 Appendix: Transaction Costs
In some stages of the simulation, the program uses a "transaction cost counter".
Costs emerge when
- players must identify and evaluate the effect of a potential or actual
move on their own payoffs; (evaluation costs);
- players, or a coalition of players, must find the best option or combina-
tion of options out of the set of all available options (optimization costs);
and when
- the members of a leading coalition must divide their net gains (distribu-
tion costs).
For evaluation and optimization, the cost of primitive events, which are then
aggregated into transaction costs are defined by two constants:
TEval: the cost of identifying the effect of a single move for the payoff
of a single player;
TOpt: the cost of comparing a pair of outcomes.
Both of these constants can be interpreted as opportunity costs of time; hence
it is possible to aggregate them into a single measure. In the program, they are
arbitrarily set at
TEval = TOpt = 0.01.
The costs emerging when members of the leading coalition must divide their
net gain are conceptually different from costs of evaluation and optimization;
they cannot be added to the costs of evaluation and optimization, and hence
will be treated separately below.
In addition, we use the following abbreviations:
n: number of players;
s: number of options that a player can exercise;
k: size of the leading coalition.
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6.1 Evaluation and Optimization Costs
Players are assumed to have costless information of their own payoffs in the
status quo situation. They incur evaluation costs in identifying their own pay-
offs in all other outcomes. In addition, players, or coalitions of players, incur
optimization costs in choosing the best one in a set of feasible outcomes. The
optimization procedure is based on pairwise comparisons among the outcomes
available.
Beyond this, we assume costless information transmission and information
processing. Thus, members of a coalition are able to communicate their own
payoffs to each other, and to aggregate these payoffs, at no additional cost.
Similarly, players outside of the coalition are assumed to be able to transmit
true information about their reservation payoffs and the payoffs expected from
a proposed move of the coalition, and the coalition will be able to calculate the
aggregate side payments and compare them to its own expected gains, all
without incurring additional transaction costs.
6.1.1 Positive and Negative Coordination
We assume that a leading coalition of size k-1 is first to be enlarged to k mem-
bers, and that it will then have to clear its proposed move with n-k potential
veto players outside of the coalition. Thus, total transaction costs will consist
of evaluation costs of the coalition, optimization costs of the coalition, and
evaluation costs of veto players.
(a) Evaluation Costs of Coalition
When the leading coalition is examining the first candidate for cooptation, the
available combinations of all options will yield a total of sk feasible outcomes
which amount to sk k payoffs for individual players. The k-1 players already
in the coalition know their own payoffs for all their options. They had to calcu-
late these (k-1) s(k-1) payoffs when the coalition of k-1 emerged from the one
with k-2 members by coopting the [k-1]th player. The kth player also knows
her payoff in the actual status quo. Hence, the total number of payoffs which
need to be evaluated is reduced by [(k-1) s(k-1) + 1], so that evaluation costs
will amount to
TEval [k sk - (k-1) s(k-1) - 1].
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The same evaluation must also be carried out for all of the n-(k-1) candidates
for cooptation. The evaluation of all opportunities for coopting an outside
player to enlarge the leading coalition thus produces total evaluation costs
amounting to
TEval (n-k+1) [k sk - (k-1) s(k-1) - 1].
(b) Optimization Costs of Coalition
In order to decide which player to coopt, the leading coalition must first deter-
mine the best outcome obtainable with each candidate, and then choose the
candidate whose cooptation could achieve the highest aggregate gain over the
reservation payoffs of all coalition members. Since sk outcomes can be realized
with each candidate, the determination of individual optima requires sk-1 pair-
wise comparisons for each of n-(k-1) candidates; and the determination of the
overall optimum is then achieved by n-k pairwise comparisons among individu-
al optima. Thus, the overall optimization cost amounts to
TOpt [(sk-1) (n-k+1) + (n-k)].
In order to propose its best move, therefore, the enlarged coalition incurs evalu-
ation costs and optimization costs amounting to
TOpt [(sk-1) (n-k+1) + (n-k)] +
TEval (n-k+1) [k sk - (k-1) s(k-1) - 1].
(c) Evaluation Costs of Veto Players
Each of (n-k) players outside of the coalition must then determine her own
payoffs in the outcome proposed, and compare these to her reservation payoffs,
in order to decide whether to exercise her veto power. The total cost will be
TEval (n-k).
(d) Further Proposals
If the first outcome proposed by the coalition is blocked by a veto, the coalition
will then propose its second-best outcome, and so on, until a proposal is accept-
ed or until the coalition has no more profitable proposals to make - at which
point the next round of cooptation will begin. Since the coalition now knows
all its options, it will incur no further evaluation costs. And since the member-
ship of the coalition will remain constant, there is also no need to compare
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solutions that could be obtained with different candidates for cooptation. More-
over, since one solution was used up in the previous trial, finding the second
proposal will require only (sk-2) pairwise comparisons. More generally, making
its ith proposal, the coalition will incur optimization costs amounting to
TOpt (sk-i).
Since players outside of the coalition will have to evaluate each proposal in
order to decide whether they should exercise their veto power, each further
proposal will also generate evaluation costs amounting to
TEval (n-k).
6.1.2 Positive plus Negative Coordination plus Bargaining
In order to arrive at its first proposal, the coalition incurs exactly the same
evaluation and optimization costs as discussed above. The same is true of the
evaluation costs incurred by players outside of the coalition. However, if the
proposal is vetoed, the coalition must now determine whether its aggregate
gains are sufficiently large to restore the reservation payoffs of the veto players.
Under our assumptions, these additional evaluations will not generate addition-
al costs: All payoffs have been evaluated before, while the truthful communica-
tion of payoffs and reservation payoffs, and the correct calculation of minimal
compensation are treated as being costless.
In this regard, our model is obviously not realistic. In the real world, the com-
pensation of negative externalities will involve negotiations in which parties
will have an interest in dissimulating their true preferences, and in which veto
players will not necessarily be content with minimum compensation. Thus, in
comparison to Positive plus Negative Coordination, the transaction costs of
Positive plus Negative Coordination plus Bargaining are underestimated in our
model. We leave it at that, for the time being. The reason is that we could not
use an aggregate measure since we have no plausible criteria for defining the
relative weights of evaluation and optimization costs on the one hand, and of
bargaining costs on the other hand.
6.1.3 Positive Coordination plus Parametric Adjustment
Again, the process of coalition formation involves the same evaluation and
optimization costs that were defined above for Positive plus Negative Coordina-
tion. Thus, when a leading coalition is enlarged from (k-1) to k members, these
costs also amount to
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TOpt [(sk-1) (n-k+1) + (n-k)] +
TEval (n-k+1) [k sk - (k-1) s(k-1) - 1].
Since there are no veto positions this time, the coalition is able to carry out its
most preferred move. In the ensuing sequential game between the coalition and
all other players, the accumulation of costs depends crucially on the number
of moves required until either a Nash equilibrium is reached, or until the play-
ers are caught in a cycle. In the course of this game, the situation is constantly
changing, so that players need to evaluate and optimize their choices whenever
they are in a position to move. In every case, the right to move goes to the actor
- an individual player or the leading coalition - with the highest expected per-
capita gain. Thus, when an individual player is about to move, she will incur
evaluation costs amounting to
TEval (s-1)
plus optimization costs of
TOpt (s-1).
Similarly, when the coalition is about to move, the evaluation costs will amount
to
TEval (sk-1) k
while the search for the optimal move incurs optimization costs of
TOpt (sk-1).
These costs are accumulated until the sequential game comes to an end, either
in a Nash equilibrium or when a cell is reached for the second time, and with
the same actor in the position to move, so that game would move into a cycle.
6.2 Distribution Costs
An outcome that is profitable for the coalition as a whole may have very differ-
ent effects on the payoffs of individual coalition members. Some may obtain
large gains, while others may even suffer losses in comparison to their reserva-
tion payoffs. Since disadvantaged members may threaten to break up the coali-
tion, a fair distribution must be negotiated. For our purposes, the criterion of
fairness is defined by the Nash bargaining solution. In order to determine the
transaction costs of reaching this solution, our simulation model approximates
the Zeuthen-Harsanyi process of "multilateral bargaining based on restricted
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bilateral bargaining" (Harsanyi 1977: 141-166; 196-201). It implies that the overall
Nash solution can be reached if each pair of players is bargaining toward a
bilateral Nash solution, given the payoffs of all other players. The process is
illustrated in the following example.
Assume a leading coalition consisting of three players, x, y and z, all of whom
enter the game with a reservation payoff of 2. Assume further that the best
outcome that the coalition can obtain would initially provide payoffs of (3 11 0)
to x, y and z respectively. The coalition as a whole would achieve a net gain
of 8 units, but player z would suffer a loss of 2 units. She would be better off
leaving the coalition - in which case nobody would gain anything. As a conse-
quence, the reservation payoffs of all losers must be restored before bargaining
over the fair distribution of net gains can even begin. In order to keep our
model simple, however, this initial compensation of losers is also handled
through the Zeuthen-Harsanyi bargaining procedure.
In our example, player z will initially challenge player y for a compensation
of 2 units. Since her threat of breaking up the coalition is entirely credible, y
will have to yield to this demand. Thus, bargaining over the fair distribution
of net gains will begin from a new outcome in which x, y and z will initially
have payoffs of (3 9 2) units, respectively. Bargaining is modeled as a sequence
of bilateral challenges in which one player demands a transfer from another
player. The demand is successful if the challenged player has more reason to
avoid the risk of breakup than the challenger. This notion is operationalized
in Harsanyi’s concept of "risk limit" as a ratio of the concession a player is
asked to make and of the loss she would suffer if negotiations fail (Harsanyi
1977: 151). The player with the lower risk limit will yield.
In our model, we assume that the worse-off player will always challenge the
better-off player to transfer a single unit of utility while the better-off player
will demand maintenance of the status quo. In our example, therefore, player
z would begin by demanding 1 unit from y - which would reduce y’s payoff
to 8, and increase z’s own payoff to 3. If agreement is not reached, all would
end up with their reservation payoffs of 2. Thus, y must compare the cost of
concession [(9-8) = 1 unit] to the cost of disagreement [(9-2) = 7 units], to arrive
at a risk limit of 1/7. By contrast, for z the cost of concession and the cost of
disagreement would both be (3-2), amounting to a risk limit of 1. Thus, y would
yield, and the new payoff distribution would be (3 8 3) for x, y and z respec-
tively.
In the next round, y’s risk limit would rise to (8-7)/(8-2) = 1/6, but z’s limit,
while reduced to (4-3)/(4-2) = 1/2, would still be larger, so that Y would again
pay the transfer, and so on. Payoffs would thus change, step by step, from
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(3 9 2) to (3 8 3) to (3 7 4) to (3 6 5) as y is forced to transfer one unit after
another to z.
In the next round, y’s risk limit would be (6-5)/(6-2) = 1/4 while z’s limit
would also have fallen to (6-5)/(6-2) = 1/4. Thus, there is now no reason why
y should make further concessions to z; instead, z would have to withdraw
her challenge in order to avoid a breakup. But now the next most disadvan-
taged player x will enter into bilateral negotiations with y. Her first challenge
will also be successful, leading to a payoff distribution of (4 5 5). Beyond this
point, no player will be able to successfully challenge any other player, and
the outcome so obtained will be the best approximation of the Nash distribution
that can be achieved.
In order to compute the transaction costs of distribution, the program counts
the number of bilateral bargaining steps that are necessary in order to reach
the Nash solution. Since players will not be directly informed of this event,
however, there will be final sequence of unsuccessful challenges involving all
pairs of players, adding k (k-1)/2 steps to the previous total. The overall mea-
sure of distribution costs will, of course, vary exponentially with the size of
the coalition. However, under the assumptions which we have introduced the
aggregate size of transaction costs depends also on the size of the net gains that
a coalition must distribute, and on the inequality of the initial distribution.
Moreover, the number of negotiations that are required in order to reach a Nash
distribution is also affected by the size of the units, relative to total gains, which
are the object of demands in each challenge. As a consequence, distribution
costs can be compared only within payoff matrices of a given dimension, and
they cannot be aggregated with evaluation and optimization costs (search costs)
into a single measure of overall transaction costs.
6.3 Comparison
We therefore use separate diagrams to show that both types of transaction costs
generally increase exponentially with the size of the leading coalition (Diagram
13 and Diagram 14). The diagrams also show that the costs incurred when
leading coalitions are enlarged incrementally, will eventually exceed the transac-
tion costs of a grand coalition that is formed directly.30 When the size of lead-
ing coalitions is limited to less than half of the total population, however, trans-
30 All values in Digram 13 and Diagram 14 are standardized by the transaction
costs the grand coalition would incur. These are fixed at 1.
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action costs remain well below those that would be incurred by a grand coali-
tion.
Transaction Costs: Evaluation and Optimization
(SQ = Random, 8 Players, 3 Options)























Diagram 13: Costs of Evaluation and Optimization
As Diagram 13 shows, search costs are lowest for combinations of Positive plus
Negative Coordination plus Bargaining (PC+NC+B). This is explained by the
fact that Bargaining reduces the number of instances in which the leading coali-
tion must recalculate its own options. In the absence of Bargaining (i.e., in
PC+NC), the leading coalition must find its next-best move whenever it encoun-
ters a veto,31 while in PC+NC+B this veto can often be bought off by the offer
of compensation (which, under our assumptions, will not entail additional
transaction costs). The relatively high costs associated with the combination
of Positive Coordination and Parametric Adjustment (PC + PA) reflects the
large number of moves and counter-moves (each requiring evaluation and
optimization) which may be needed before the noncooperative game will come
to rest in an equilibrium or enter into a cycle.
31 For similar reasons, transaction costs are initially lower if the game starts from
a status quo position in which joint payoffs are at a minimum. When the reserva-
tion payoffs of most players are very low, new initiatives will encounter fewer
vetoes than if the game starts from a status quo situation selected at random.
It can also be shown that the effect of the selection of the first status quo is stron-
ger in PC+NC than in PC+NC+B.
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Transaction Costs: Distribution
(SQ = Random, 8 Players, 3 Options)























Diagram 14: Costs of Distribution
The variation in the transaction costs of distribution (Diagram 14) is explained
by the fact that, ceteris paribus, the number of offers and counteroffers required
to reach a Nash distribution depends not only (exponentially) on the size of
the leading coalition, but also on the size of the net gain which the coalition
must distribute among its members. Thus the combination of Positive plus
Negative Coordination plus Bargaining (PC+NC+B), which produces the largest
gains for the coalition, is also associated with the highest transaction costs of
distribution. Conversely, the combination of Positive Coordination and Paramet-
ric Adjustment (PC+PA) which is least attractive from the coalition’s point of
view, because potential gains are often wiped out by countermoves of players
outside of the coalition, also incurs the lowest costs of distribution. Distribution
costs are also relatively low for (PC+NC) where the gains which the coalition
can achieve are limited by the exercise of vetoes.
Unfortunately, for our purposes, this also means that the procedure associated
with the lowest search costs (PC+NC+B) is also the procedure with the highest
distribution costs. Moreover, as was pointed out above, the magnitudes of these
different types of cost cannot be directly compared or aggregated into a single
measure. Thus we are unable to present conclusions about the relative cost
intensity of different coordination procedures. All we can say is that all are
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associated with transaction costs that increase exponentially with the size of
the leading coalition.
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